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Essay on Analyst Herding
Cyrus Aghamolla
This study investigates a dynamic model of analyst forecasting where the ordering of
forecasts and analysts’ information endowments are endogenously determined. Analysts
are probabilistically informed, potentially biased, and can increase their informedness
through information acquisition. I characterize the unique equilibrium which holds for
general distributions. The results show that analysts with less bias, greater precision,
or a greater likelihood of being informed forecast earlier. Moreover, the main results
show (perhaps surprisingly) that analysts always choose to be imperfectly informed, even
though information acquisition is costless. This arises from the incentive to induce more
timely forecasting by the other analyst. Likewise, analysts choose a positive bias level
in equilibrium in order to gain a strategic advantage in their forecast timing. I discuss
a number of empirical implications and extend the model to allow analysts to learn over
time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A rich empirical literature has documented a well-known regularity that sell-side analysts
may strategically time their forecasts for the purpose of observational learning.1 Indeed,
the notion that analysts can learn from each other (or more specifically, from the reports of
those who have forecasted before them) is a ubiquitous and pervasive phenomenon persis-
tent through two decades of research.2 Meanwhile, a disparate yet equally rich literature
has shown that analysts tend to upwardly bias their forecasts,3 and that information ac-
quisition/production plays a crucial role in an analyst’s responsibilities (e.g. Ivkovic and
Jegadeesh (2004), Chen, Cheng, and Lo (2010), Livnat and Zhang (2012), Keskek, Tse,
and Tucker (2014), Altschuler, Chen, and Zhou (2015), Brown et al. (2015)). A natu-
ral question thus arises: If analysts can learn from each other, then how does this affect
1See De Bondt and Forbes (1999), Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), Welch (2000), Cooper, Day, and
Lewis (2001), Zitzewitz (2001), Gleason and Lee (2003), Hong and Kubik (2003), Clement and Tse (2005),
Jegadeesh and Kim (2010), Clement, Hales, and Xue (2011), Shroff, Venkataraman, and Xin (2014), and
Keskek, Tse, and Tucker (2014).
2Welch (2000) finds that“the buy or sell recommendations of security analysts have a significant positive
influence on the recommendations of the next two analysts” (p. 369). This finding has been reinforced in
numerous subsequent studies, namely Cooper et al. (2001), Clement and Tse (2005), Jegadeesh and Kim
(2010), Keskek et al. (2014), and Shroff et al. (2014).
Analysts can also potentially access other analysts’ reports through their buy-side clients before they
have been publicly released (see Irvine, Lipsett, and Puckett (2007)). Anecdotal evidence suggests that
this is not unusual.
3For example, see De Bondt and Thaler (1990), Francis and Philbrick (1993), Dugar and Nathan
(1995), McNichols and O’Brien (1997), Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan (1998), Lin and McNichols
(1998), Easterwood and Nutt (1999), Michaely and Womack (1999), Kothari (2001), Lim (2001), Jackson
(2005), Brenhardt et al. (2006), Chen and Jiang (2006), and Raedy, Shane, and Yang (2006), among
others.
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their forecast timing, and, more importantly, their central responsibility of information
acquisition/discovery? Although these aspects of analyst behavior have received consid-
erable attention in the empirical literature, few theoretical studies examine the strategic
interdependence between analyst forecast timing, information acquisition, and the role of
bias.
In this paper, I seek to bridge this gap by providing a unified theory of analyst fore-
casting where the timing of the forecast, information acquisition, and level of affiliation
are endogenously chosen. The results show that the forecast order is determined by the
analyst’s information quality, information endowment, and potential bias, where the more
precise, better informed, or less biased analyst forecasts earlier in expectation. Moreover,
due to strategic considerations regarding the subsequent forecast timing, analysts choose
to be imperfectly informed in equilibrium, even when information acquisition is costless.
This result establishes a direct theoretical link between the learning incentives of analysts
and their information acquisition, which has heretofore not been captured in the theoret-
ical literature. The results also show that analysts choose to be affiliated in equilibrium,
thus providing a theoretical justification for why an analyst may choose employment in
which she may encounter a conflict of interest.
The setting is one where each of two analysts must first acquire information and
then decide when to issue a forecast of a firm’s terminal value. Each analyst has an
incentive to delay her forecast in order to observe the report and the corresponding private
information of her peer. The additional information from the first analyst’s forecast (the
“leader”) complements the private information of the remaining analyst (the “follower”),
and allows for a more accurate prediction by the follower. The key feature of the model
is that there may be uncertainty as to the information endowment of each analyst, and
this endowment probability is endogenously determined. This assumption differs from
virtually all other models of analyst forecast timing, which typically assume that an analyst
receives a (potentially noisy) signal of the firm’s value with probability one. Although
conventional in the theoretical literature, the assumption that an analyst is always endowed
with useful information does not seem entirely plausible in practice. Indeed, allowing for
the probabilistic endowment of information leads to results that help explain a number of
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empirical regularities which have not been captured by previous studies.
Prior to the forecasting decision, each analyst independently chooses the probability
for which she receives information in the following stage, and this decision is publicly
observable. The likelihood of receiving information can be thought of as an analyst’s
choice of how many firms or industries to follow; analysts considered specialists who focus
on a particular industry are more likely to have insightful information as compared to
generalists who follow several industries.4 The choice of endowment probability can be
equivalently represented as an observable effort decision that an analyst makes in each
forecasting period, where the amount of effort determines the likelihood that the analyst
receives information. Moreover, high informedness can be alternatively interpreted as an
analyst’s decision to join a firm that has a reputation for extensive information production,
such as firms which commonly perform due diligence in the underwriting stage of IPOs,
and thus typically receive superior information with a high likelihood. Similarly, high
informedness can represent an analyst whose firm specializes in one particular industry
or has established lines of communication with certain company executives, whereas less
informedness captures an analyst whose firm covers a wide range of industries with a
dispersed network of executives, yet with less depth.5 At the firm level, high informedness
can be thought of as a brokerage house or investment-banking firm which emphasizes their
research division through a larger allocation of resources.
The analysts’ payoff depends on their squared forecast error and the timeliness of their
forecast, which is captured by discounting. Several studies document that an analyst’s
compensation crucially depends on their accuracy.6 The forecast error in the analyst’s
4This is consistent with the analysis of Clement and Tse (2005), who find that analysts who follow
many industries are more likely to herd. Indeed, the authors conclude that this is “due to analysts’ inability
to develop and use specialized knowledge when they follow many companies or industries” (p. 329).
5As noted in Brown et al. (2015), executives may privately disclose immaterial information for the
analyst’s broader “mosaic.” They conclude that “information conveyed in private conversations with man-
agement is extremely valuable to sell-side analysts in the post-Reg FD environment” (p. 20). The survey
of executives in Soltes (2014) has a similar conclusion that frequent private communication with executives
and management plays a significant role for sell-side analysts.
6See Stickel (1992), Mikhail, Walther, and Willis (1999), Hong, Kubik, and Solomon (2000), Hong
and Kubik (2003), and Wu and Zhang (2009). Additionally, Hong and Kubik (2003) state: “Even if the
compensation of analysts does not depend explicitly on forecast accuracy, to generate investment banking
business or trading commissions in the longer run, analysts need to cultivate a reputation for forecast
expertise among the buy-side” (p. 314).
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utility can also indirectly capture the payoff from a subsequent stock recommendation
which is more profitable given the analyst’s forecast accuracy, as evidenced in Loh and
Mian (2006), Ertimur, Sunder, and Sunder (2007), and Brown et al. (2015). Likewise,
timeliness is also an important determinant of an analyst’s compensation,7 as expedi-
tious forecasts can generate trading volume and affect promotions (Cooper et al. (2001),
Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011)). In subsequent analysis, I allow the analysts to
be potentially biased in that their compensation may also depend on an endogenously
chosen distortion parameter. This represents the analyst’s choice of employment, whether
at a brokerage house, investment-banking firm, or independent research institution. As
shown in a number of studies (e.g. Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin and McNichols (1997),
Michaely and Womack (1999), Mola and Guidolin (2009)), analysts employed by broker-
age houses and investment banks, rather than those employed by independent research
firms, tend to issue more biased forecasts. While the advantages of working for the former
may seem intuitively obvious (e.g. greater resources), this study offers a novel explanation
for an analyst’s choice of affiliated employment, wherein affiliation arises from a strategic
advantage in the forecast timing.
The results concerning the timing of forecasts show that the expected forecast order is
determined by (i) the quality, or precision, of the analyst’s information, (ii) the analyst’s
likelihood of being informed, and (iii) the magnitude of the analyst’s bias. We see that
analysts who have better quality information, are more likely to be informed, or have
less potential bias forecast earlier. Moreover, the main result shows that analysts always
choose to be imperfectly informed–that is, to be uninformed with positive probability–even
when information acquisition is costless. This emerges due to the analyst’s incentive to
induce the other analyst to forecast earlier and observe their private information. Similarly,
analysts choose employment where their compensation potentially relies on issuing a biased
forecast in order to induce more timely forecasting by the other analyst.
The equilibrium of the forecasting subgame resembles that of a war of attrition with
private information, where each informed analyst mixes between issuing a forecast and
7See Schipper (1991) for a discussion and Cooper et al. (2001), Hong and Kubik (2003), Jackson
(2005), Groysberg et al. (2011), and Loh and Stulz (2011) for empirical support.
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remaining quiet at every instant. Mixing occurs in equilibrium as analysts strategically
mimic uninformedness in order to induce their peer to forecast earlier. We see that the path
of the probabilistic forecast time follows an exponential distribution which reaches one at
an endogenously determined terminal time. Because the model allows for heterogeneity
in the analysts’ precision, distribution, endowment, discount rate, and bias, the mixing
probabilities can vary between the two analysts. If this is the case, then the analyst with
the “slower” mixing rate will forecast with discrete probability at the beginning of the
forecasting subgame, thus leading her expected forecast time to be earlier in equilibrium.
In the information acquisition subgame which precedes the forecasting stage, each
analyst simultaneously chooses her likelihood of receiving private information. Since the
analyst with a relatively higher likelihood of receiving information forecasts earlier in
expectation, each analyst has an incentive to select an endowment probability just below
the other’s. This leads to an equilibrium choice of endowment probability that is less than
one for both analysts.
The results help explain a number of empirical regularities. With regard to herding,
the results show that the forecast order is determined by the precision and endowment
of the analysts’ information. This helps explain the findings of Cooper et al. (2001),
Clement and Tse (2005), and Keskek et al. (2014), who document evidence supporting
the hypothesis that analysts with superior information forecast earlier. The results also
support the conclusions of Shroff, Venkataraman, and Xin (2014), wherein the forecasts of
analysts who follow the leader also contain material information. Moreover, the results of
the model comport nicely with the empirical findings of Cooper et al. (2001), who conclude
that forecasting ability is best measured by the timeliness of the forecast rather than the
forecast error. Perhaps most surprisingly, the results help explain why affiliated analysts
provide more accurate forecasts than independent analysts, as found in Jacob, Lys, and
Neale (1999) and Jacob, Rock, and Weber (2008). The results imply that, rather than due
to differences in resources or access to non-public information, analysts who join brokerage
or investment-banking firms gain an informational advantage through the strategic timing
of forecasts (i.e. the empirical results are driven by analyst selection of employment).
Moreover, the results are in line with the findings of Das, Levine, and Sivaramakrishnan
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(1998), who document higher levels of bias for analysts’ forecasts when there is relatively
less public information. In addition, the results correspond to the findings of Gu and Xue
(2008), who document that affiliated analysts issue comparatively more accurate earnings
forecasts for firms which are also followed by less biased or independent analysts. The
results also help to explain the trend for analysts to cover more firms, and sheds light on
why some analysts become generalists rather than specialists.
While the model fits nicely with several existing empirical regularities, the results also
offer several avenues for future research in terms of empirical predictions. As mentioned
previously, the results suggest that relatively earlier forecasts should contain less bias
or distortion. Correspondingly, the level of bias or distortion in the forecasts should be
comparatively higher when a firm is covered by more analysts. Moreover, we should see
more timely forecasts overall when the public information is stronger and when a single
highly informed analyst is following the firm. The results of the model also imply that
clustered forecasts which occur later should have comparatively higher forecast errors
than of clustered forecasts which emerge earlier. The results pertaining to information
acquisition indicate that individual forecasts should be relatively less informative, even for
earlier forecasts, when there is increased analyst following. The results also imply that
high analyst following does not necessarily mean a less opaque informational environment
for the firm. Rather, the timeliness of the analysts’ forecasts is more indicative of the
transparency or strength of a firm’s information environment. This follows from the results
which imply that (i) increased analyst following may not reduce information asymmetry,
(ii) analysts forecast earlier when the precision of their private information is higher and
when they are more likely to be informed, and (iii) analysts issue more timely forecasts
when there is better public information. The empirical predictions are further discussed
in section 5.
1.1 Related literature
This study is related to a number of literatures. I first discuss the current study in the
context of the extant literature on forecast timing. Gul and Lundholm (1995) examine a
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model where two agents must make a forecast decision and can benefit from observing the
announcement of their competitor. They characterize the symmetric equilibrium where
agents with good news forecast earlier than agents with bad news. The setting here is
similar to Gul and Lundholm (1995) in that both models involve endogenous timing with
an interdependent value structure. The current model fundamentally differs from Gul
and Lundholm (1995) in four ways: (i) in this setting, agents have uncertainty over the
information endowment, whereas Gul and Lundholm assume agents are informed with
probability one; (ii) the analysts’ payoffs do not depend on the value of the firm, whereas
Gul and Lundholm assume the waiting costs are increasing in the value of the firm, thus
leading to the aforementioned equilibrium; (iii) analysts may be heterogenous in every
dimension, whereas Gul and Lundholm assume agents are homogenous; and (iv) analysts
also engage in information acquisition and choice of employment.8
Guttman (2010), Aghamolla and Hashimoto (2015), and Xue (2015) also explore ana-
lysts’ endogenous forecast timing. Guttman (2010) considers a setting where the analysts’
precision improves over time, though the payoff from forecasting decreases as the pool of
public information improves. Guttman shows how clustering and dispersion of forecasts
can emerge. The current setting varies in that the focus is on the equilibrium properties
when analysts can learn from the forecasts of other analysts, whereas this feature is absent
in Guttman (2010). Moreover, several of the insights of Guttman (2010) also hold in the
single-analyst setting of his model, whereas the strategic interaction between analysts is
a fundamental feature of the current model. In the extensions, I allow for information ar-
rival to occur stochastically over time, accentuate the salience of timeliness through varied
compensation for the leader and follower, as well as show how the payoff function can be
endogenized from a market for information as in Guttman (2010).
Xue (2015) investigates a herding model with both an affiliated and independent ana-
lyst, where the affiliated analyst receives a more precise signal and the independent analyst
8In terms of technical assumptions, Gul and Lundholm limit their setting to uniformly distributed
signals with a finite support, whereas the results in the forecasting subgame here hold for general and
heterogenous distributions. Gul and Lundholm also characterize the unique symmetric pure strategy Nash
equilibrium, however, there are also a multiplicity of asymmetric equilibria and potential mixed strategy
equilibria. In contrast, the results in the forecasting subgame here are characterized by a unique perfect
Bayesian equilibrium without refinements.
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can acquire costly information. Xue shows that the independent analyst acquires more
information in the presence of the affiliated analyst in order to induce the affiliated an-
alyst to issue a less biased forecast. The model here differs from Xue (2015) in that the
strategic timing of forecasts is a fundamental feature of this setting, whereas timing is
largely fixed in Xue’s model. The current setting also allows for two-sided and costless
information acquisition and two-sided endogenous choice of affiliation.9 Aghamolla and
Hashimoto (2015) examine an endogenous timing model with several analysts and show
results regarding delay and clustering in analyst forecasting. The current setting differs
in that the primary focus is on the interdependence of forecast timing and information
acquisition.
This study is also related to the endogenous investment timing literature, particularly
Chamley and Gale (1994) and Zhang (1997). These papers show investment cascades
following the investment choice of the first agent. In contrast, due to the continuous
firm value, the equilibrium here does not involve an information cascade as an informed
analyst never disregards her private information. Moreover, the present model does not
include an unknown cost (as in Zhang (1997)) and exhibits delay in continuous time
(unlike Chamley and Gale (1994)). This paper also builds on the literature concerning
reputations in repeated games with two-sided private information, as in Kreps and Wilson
(1982), Fudenberg and Tirole (1986), and Abreu and Gul (2000), by endogenizing the ex
ante reputation. Kim and Lee (2014) study a concession game where two agents may
acquire information about an unknown state variable which affects the payoffs of both
agents in the event that the game ends suddenly. Among many differences, Kim and Lee
assume that the game terminates with a Poisson arrival and that there is never private
information of an agent’s informedness–agents pay a fixed cost to acquire information with
probability one and this is publicly observed. Kim and Lee rather focus on the effects of
disclosure rules of the unknown termination payoff, whereas the focus of this study is on
the effects of multiple analysts on information acquisition.
The current setting varies from reputational herding models (Scharfstein and Stein
9The results in Xue (2015) also critically depend on the discrete structure of the message space (though
continuous signal), whereas this is continuous in the current setting.
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(1990), Trueman (1994)), in that the forecast order is endogenous and the analysts’ utility
is indirectly affected by their type through the forecast error, rather than explicitly through
a market belief of the type. These models also assume that the agents’ payoff does not
depend on the value of the realized outcome. This paper is also related to studies which
examine analyst information acquisition. These studies consider information acquisition in
the context of dynamic cheap talk with unknown alignment (Meng (2015)), varying levels
of public information (Fischer and Stocken (2010)), or when the analyst’s compensation
is based on trading commissions (Hayes (1998)). Among other differences, these studies
focus primarily on single-analyst settings, whereas the current model examines information
acquisition in the presence of strategic interaction between analysts. This paper also differs
from Ottaviani and Sørenson’s (2006) reputational cheap talk model as the focus of this
study is on the effects of endogenous timing on information acquisition, whereas these are
both exogenous in their setting.
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section describes the model, while Section
3 analyzes the equilibrium and presents the results. Section 4 examines the model when
analysts may choose their level of affiliation and Section 5 discusses empirical implications
and predictions. Section 6 explores a number of extensions and the final section concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix unless otherwise specified.
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Chapter 2
Model
The model is composed of two analysts i ∈ {1, 2} who first simultaneously make an infor-
mation acquisition decision and then decide when to issue a forecast. Time is assumed to
be continuous following the analysts’ information acquisition decision at date 0. I assume
that analysts are uninformed with probability xi ∈ [0, 1] and receive information with
probability 1−xi. The information acquisition subgame at time 0 consists of three stages
(as depicted in Figure 1). In the first stage of t = 0, each analyst chooses their probability
of receiving information. Correspondingly, in the following stage, each analyst’s choice of
xi is publicly revealed and analysts receive private information with probability 1− xi.
1,2
An analyst is said to be uninformed if she does not receive a signal of the firm value.
An informed analyst receives a signal yi = vi + εi, where vi is a random variable drawn
from some distribution Gi (vi) which has mean µi and variance σ
2
i , and εi is a zero mean
error term drawn from a distribution Θi. I assume that Gi and Θi are such that the
conditional variance of vi, denoted by ω
2
i , is constant for all realizations of yi.
3 The
1This is equivalent to assuming that analysts make an observable effort decision, ei ∈ [e, e], which maps
into the likelihood of receiving information, i.e. Υ : [e, e] 7→ [0, 1]. An observable effort decision can be
thought of as the analyst’s acquisition of a useful data set, meetings with management teams or executives,
and non-deal road shows where the analyst connects buy-side investors/clients with the executives of a
firm they cover.
2I assume that information acquisition is costless to emphasize that the result is not driven by acqui-
sition costs but rather from strategic considerations in the forecast timing. Allowing costly information
acqusition does not qualitatively affect the results.
3All of the results hold if an informed analyst instead receives a perfect signal yi = vi, however, I allow
Θi to be non-degenerate for richer comparative statics.
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conditional variance ω2i can be thought of as the analyst’s experience or prior forecasting
ability (see Clement and Tse (2005)). The total firm (terminal) value, V , is the sum of
the two components:
V = v1 + v2.
The components v1 and v2 are assumed to be independent, however, the results would
not qualitatively change if they are correlated. The firm value takes an additive structure
to capture complementarities in the informed analysts’ information. The additive nature
can be thought of as a firm with two segments in disparate industries, where analysts
differ in their industry specialities and thus acquire information pertaining to their area of
expertise. However, because each analyst must forecast the total expected terminal value
of the firm, she benefits from observing the forecast of her peer. Note that all of the results
continue to hold under an alternative specification where analysts instead receive a joint











This is discussed further in Section 6.3. I assume that the value is additively separable
for richer comparative statics (e.g. with regard to σ2i ), and to allow for more general
distributions of v.
The forecasting subgame begins in the final stage of t = 0, where each analyst decides
when to issue a forecast in continuous time. Analyst i’s utility is given by:
ui =
[
s− (mi − V )
2
]
e−riτi · I, (2.1)
where mi is analyst i’s forecast, ri is analyst i’s rate of time preference, and τi ∈ [0,∞)
is the time in which analyst i issues her forecast.4 The value s is the compensation the




2 , and I is an indicator
function equal to one if a forecast is made.5,6 Each analyst’s utility is decreasing in her
4Section 6.4 discusses endogenizing the payoff function to incorporate the demand for information (as
in Guttman (2010)).
5An analyst who does not issue a forecast receives a payoff of 0.
6Allowing the uninformed type to rather be partially informed would not qualitatively affect the results.
In this case, we would instead have the analyst’s type be one of two precision levels, ρ ∈ {ρH , ρL}, which








, and ω2H,i + σ
2





notational and expositional ease, I set ρL = 0.
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Analysts learn if they are 
informed and observe the




and decide when 




Time 0, Stage 2. Time 0, Stage 1. Time 0, Stage 3. 
squared forecast error, as illustrated by the disutility (mi − V )
2. The discount rate, e−riτi ,
is meant to capture the importance of timeliness of the forecast. Figure 2.1 presents a
timeline of the model.
In Section 6.2, I allow for the compensation s to vary in the forecast order to further
examine the importance of timeliness. The baseline model also does not include potential
biases in the analysts’ payoff function; this is explored in Section 4. The equilibrium
concept employed is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. The following section characterizes the
equilibrium of the baseline model.
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Chapter 3
Equilibrium
I first analyze the equilibrium of the forecasting subgame, taking xi as given. Following
the characterization of the equilibrium forecasting strategies, I solve for the endogenous
choice of xi which occurs in the information acquisition subgame.
3.1 Forecasting subgame
In the forecasting subgame, each analyst decides when to issue a forecast. As we can see
from the utility structure, each analyst receives a strictly higher payoff if she first observes
the announcement of the other analyst before issuing her forecast. Recall that the first
analyst to issue a forecast is referred to as the leader, and the second to forecast is referred
to as the follower. An informed analyst who forecasts first submits the report:
mi = E (vi|yi) + E (vj) .
We see that the expected utility from an informed leader who forecasts at time t is Eui =
(




e−rit, and that of an informed follower is Eui =
(





uninformed analyst only issues a forecast when another forecast has been made, and
simply repeats the forecast made by the leader. We see that there is a natural incentive
to mimic uninformedness, as an analyst will not delay issuing her forecast if she believes
her peer to be uninformed. An informed analyst thus trades off the benefit of waiting
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to observe the other analyst’s forecast with the cost of waiting from a discounted payoff.
The equilibrium of the forecasting subgame is akin to a war of attrition with two-sided
asymmetric information (e.g. Kreps and Wilson (1982), Ponsati and Sakovics (1995)).
The equilibrium is derived in a number of steps and produces a tractable closed-form
characterization of the strategies. We see that any equilibrium forecast strategy must
have the following properties:
Claim 1: There does not exist an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Suppose we have an equilibrium where analyst 1 forecasts at time t1 with probability
one. In this case, analyst 2 will either forecast immediately after t1, i.e. at time t2 = t1+δ
for δ > 0, or forecast immediately, i.e. at t2 = 0. If analyst 2 forecasts an instant after
t1, then analyst 1 can do strictly better by saving the discounting costs and forecasting
immediately at time 0. However, if analyst 2 does not observe a time 0 forecast from
analyst 1, then analyst 2’s posterior that analyst 1 is uninformed must go to one, in which
case analyst 2 is better off forecasting an instant after time 0 than at some later time.
Consequently, this provides an incentive for an informed analyst 1 to delay her forecast
time. A similar argument can be made for analyst 2. Hence, any equilibrium must be in
mixed strategies.
Let analyst i’s forecast strategy be denoted by F̄i (t), which represents the probability
that an informed analyst i forecasts by time t. Let the corresponding hazard rate be
denoted by hi (t) ≡
f̄i(t)
(1−F̄i(t))
Similarly, let Fi (t) denote the unconditional probability that
analyst i issues a forecast by time t.1
Claim 2: Informed analysts will have forecasted with probability one by an endoge-
nously determined, common terminal time T .
To see this, suppose that for an informed analyst 1, her equilibrium path F̄1 (t) reaches
one at some time T1. This implies that an informed analyst 1 would have forecasted with
certainty prior to T1 and the posterior that analyst 1 is uninformed must go to one. Hence,
an informed analyst 2 will not delay forecasting if she believes that analyst 1 is uninformed
with probability 1, and thus will forecast by T1 as well. Therefore, F̄1 (T ) = F̄2 (T ) = 1
1I use the conditional probability in the exposition to better convey the intuition of the equilibrium.
All of the claims hold for the corresponding unconditional probability.
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at some endogenously determined terminal time T . A similar argument can be made for
analyst 2. This implies that the common terminal time must be the minimum of T1 and
T2.
Claim 3: F̄i (t) must be continuous for all t > 0.
Suppose analyst i’s strategy F̄1 (t) had a discontinuity at some time t, then analyst 2
could do strictly better by not forecasting until an instant after time t, i.e. t+ δ, rather
than issuing a forecast at an instant before time t, i.e. t − δ. Hence, analyst 2 would
strictly prefer to wait in the interval [t− δ, t], but this implies that analyst 1 could do
strictly better by forecasting with discrete probability at time t− δ than at time t.
Claim 4: F̄i (t) must be strictly increasing until it reaches one.
Suppose F̄1 (t) was constant on some interval, [a, b], which implies that analyst 1 will
not forecast in this interval. Analyst 2 can then do strictly better by either forecasting
with discrete probability at an instant before time a or an instant after time b. If analyst
2 does not forecast with positive probability until an instant after time b, then analyst 1
can do strictly better by forecasting with discrete probability at time a than at time b,
but this violates Claim 3. Likewise, Claim 3 is violated if analyst 2 forecasts with discrete
probability an instant before time a.
Claim 5: At most one analyst can have a discrete mass point at time 0.
By Claims 3 and 4, an analyst may forecast with discrete probability only at time
0. However, both analysts cannot have a mass point, since otherwise one analyst can do
strictly better by waiting at time 0 with probability one rather than forecasting.
Claims 1-5 indicate that F̄i (t) must be continuous, strictly increasing, and reaches one
at some time T for i ∈ {1, 2}. To get a sense of the equilibrium mixing condition, we can
examine the local incentive constraint for an informed analyst i.2 This is given by the
following indifference condition:
[




e−rit = βj (t)hj (t)∆t
(





+ [1− βj (t)hj (t)∆t]
(





2The solution can be alternatively derived using local incentive compatibility conditions, which are
sufficient since equation (3.3) is supermodular in t.
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where βj (t) is the posterior probability that analyst j is informed by time t and hj (t) is
analyst j’s hazard rate. The LHS is analyst i’s payoff from forecasting at time t, given
that analyst j has not yet forecasted. The RHS of equation (3.1) is analyst i’s payoff
from waiting one unit of time, ∆t,3 and potentially observing analyst j’s forecast. If
analyst j issues a forecast in the interval [t, t+∆t], then analyst i observes this forecast
and issues her own forecast, for a payoff of
(




e−rt. However, if analyst j does
not forecast in this interval, then analyst i issues a forecast at time t+∆t, for a payoff of
(




e−ri(t+∆t), where βj (t)hj (t)∆t captures the probability that an informed
analyst j issues a forecast in the interval [t, t+∆t]. Hence, in equilibrium, each analyst
must be indifferent between forecasting immediately and waiting an additional instant.
Taking ∆t→ 0 and by L’Hôpital’s rule, equation (3.1) becomes:
(











Equation (3.2) illustrates the trade-off of waiting for analyst i. The cost of delaying the
forecast, which is the loss from discounting (given by the LHS), must exactly offset the
benefit of waiting, which is the expected improvement in the error of analyst i’s forecast
(given by the RHS).










e−riafj (a) da+ (1− Fj (t))
(





Thus, in order for analyst i to be indifferent at every time t, ui must be constant at
all times. Note that the global constraint in equation (3.3) is expressed in terms of the
unconditional probability that analyst j forecasts by time t, Fj (t).
Let Ti denote the endogenous terminal time for analyst i, at which an informed analyst
i would have forecasted with probability one. Due to the heterogeneity in the analysts’
preferences, we may have that F̄j (t) may reach one earlier than F̄i (t), and thus implying
that Tj < Ti. We see how this can arise by considering equation (3.1). Analyst j must set
3More precisely, intervals of time, ∆t, are assumed to be vanishingly small, and can rather be thought
of as the limit ∆t→ 0.
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F̄j (t) so that analyst i is indifferent at every instant. If analyst i’s LHS payoff is relatively
higher than analyst j’s, then analyst j will be mixing at a higher rate (i.e. forecasting
with greater probability) than analyst i in equilibrium, thus leading F̄j (t) to reach one
at an earlier time than F̄i (t). Intuitively, if analyst i has a lower option value of waiting
(e.g. if ω2j > ω
2
i ), then analyst j must forecast with a relatively higher probability at
each instant to keep analyst i indifferent, which leads to Tj < Ti. However, by Claim 2,
the terminal time for informed analysts i and j must be equal. Hence, we have that both
informed analysts must forecast by time T = min {T1, T2}. In order for this to be the case,
analyst i must forecast with discrete probability at t = 0+ to align the path of beliefs, so
that Ti is reached at the same time as Tj . The atom at time 0 is uniquely determined
by the degree of the heterogeneity in the parameters, thus establishing uniqueness of the
forecasting subgame equilibrium. Moreover, this implies that the analyst with the lower
option value of waiting forecasts earlier in equilibrium. The solution to the forecasting
subgame is characterized as follows:
Lemma 1 There is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the forecasting subgame where
(i) an uninformed analyst forecasts if and only if a forecast by the other analyst is made;
(ii) both informed types will have forecasted by time T = min
{






and (iii) the strategy profiles for informed types are given by:
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In the symmetric case where the analysts’ preferences are homogeneous, neither analyst
forecasts with discrete probability at time 0 since it is already the case that Tj = Ti. In the
heterogeneous case, the above result states that the analyst with the lower option value
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of waiting forecasts at t = 0+ with probability 1− x
−ci/cj
j xi or 1− x
−cj/ci
i xj if Tj < Ti or
Tj > Ti, respectively. Lemma 1 also provides a theoretical basis for the use of the leader-
follower test statistic, which assumes an exponential arrival of forecasts, by studies that
empirically investigate analyst herding (e.g. Cooper et al. (2001), Shroff et al. (2014)).
Figure 3.1 illustrates the time 0 mass point.
The option value of waiting is captured by the precision levels, 1
ω2
i
, likelihood of en-
dowment, 1− xi, public information, σ
2
i , and the incremental cost of waiting, ri. We can
pin down the expected forecast order according to the analyst who forecasts with discrete
probability at time 0:
Corollary 1 Ceteris paribus, the forecasting time is earlier when analysts have more pre-
cise information
(
T is decreasing in 1
ω2i
)
, and the analyst with more precise information
forecasts earlier with higher probability.
The above Corollary states that the analyst with better information (higher precision)
is expected to forecast first in equilibrium. Moreover, we see that the overall forecasting
time improves when just one of the analysts has better information. This corresponds to
the findings of Cooper et al. (2001), Clement and Tse (2005), and Keskek et al. (2014)
CHAPTER 3. EQUILIBRIUM 19
who find that analysts with superior information issue more timely forecasts. A similar
result holds for the endowment probability:
Corollary 2 Ceteris paribus, the forecasting time is earlier when analysts are more likely
to be informed, and the analyst with a higher probability of receiving information forecasts
earlier.
When the probability of being informed, 1 − xi, is treated as exogenously given, the
result in Corollary 2 states that the analyst with a higher 1 − xi (lower xi) will forecast
earlier in equilibrium. As we will see in the solution of the information acquisition subgame,
this incentivizes the analysts to choose a lower endowment probability to induce the other
analyst to forecast earlier. The level of public information and the discount rate have a
similar effect on the option value of waiting:
Corollary 3 Ceteris paribus, the forecasting time is earlier when analysts have a higher
rate of time preference or have better public information
(





The analyst with a higher discount rate forecasts earlier and the analyst whose segment





As we expect, discounting speeds up the timing of the forecast and the more impatient
analyst forecasts first in equilibrium. Similarly, the better the pool of public information,
the more timely the forecasts. This occurs since the option value of waiting is decreasing
in the precision of public information, 1
σ2i
, thus speeding up the forecast times. Surpris-
ingly, we see that the analyst whose segment has worse public information, that is, whose







= σ2i . This implies that analyst j has a comparatively higher option value of
waiting since she can reduce her forecast error more by observing the forecast of analyst i.
Hence, the analyst whose segment has relatively worse public information forecasts earlier
in equilibrium.
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3.2 Information acquisition
Prior to the forecasting subgame, each analyst simultaneously chooses the probability to
which she receives information, 1 − xi. In the subsequent stage, the endowment like-
lihoods are publicly revealed and analysts, if informed, privately observe their signals.
The choice of xi is costless and indeed both analysts may choose to receive information
with probability one. However, from the equilibrium of the forecasting subgame, analysts
have a strategic advantage from being imperfectly informed. As shown in Corollary 2,
the analyst with a higher endowment probability forecasts earlier. When choosing xi, an
analyst weighs the cost of being potentially uninformed–not receiving a signal with higher
probability–and the benefits from inducing the other analyst to forecast earlier. To find
the optimal choice of xi, it is useful to first examine the simplified case where only one
analyst chooses her xi, keeping the other’s fixed. Note that in a single-analyst setting, the
analyst will choose to be perfectly informed with probability one.
3.2.1 One-sided choice of xi
For the analysis in this section, I assume xj is fixed and known in order to analyze the
equilibrium behavior of analyst i. This provides insights that will be helpful when exam-
ining the two-sided choice of xi in the following subsection. We see from Lemma 1 that
the equilibrium payoff for an informed analyst i is given as:
(1− Fj (0))
(











Fj (0) is the potential atom at time 0, where Fj (0) = 0 if Ti ≥ Tj and Fj (0) = 1−x
−cj/ci
i xj





Ti ≥ Tj . This arises due to the equilibrium condition that the analysts’ utility is kept
constant at every instant in the forecasting subgame.
First, note that when one, and only one, analyst is known to be informed with probabil-
ity one, i.e. when 1−xj = 1, the unique equilibrium is where analyst j forecasts immedi-
ately. In this case, analyst i’s strategy is to issue a forecast only upon observing a forecast
by analyst j. To see this for xj = 0 and xi > 0, note that there cannot exist an equilibrium
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in which an informed analyst i forecasts with a pure strategy at a time t before analyst j,
as analyst i then has a strictly profitable deviation of mimicking uninformedness at time t
and withhold forecasting. Also, there cannot be any equilibrium in mixed strategies as in
Lemma 1. Mixing breaks down in this case as analyst j would forecast with probability
one once her posterior that analyst i is uninformed goes to one, however this violates the
condition that analyst i would be indifferent at every instant–as she would strictly prefer
to delay forecasting a moment before analyst j forecasts for sure.4 Hence, any equilibrium
must entail a pure strategy of analyst j forecasting prior to analyst i, in which case analyst
j then prefers to forecast immediately and save the discounting costs. We can also see
this from the indifference condition. The argument implies that Fi (t) = 0 for all t, and
we can see from equation (3.1) that
[











analyst j strictly prefers to forecast immediately than wait in equilibrium when xj = 0
and xi > 0.
Lemma 2 When xj = 0 and xi > 0, analyst j forecasts at t = 0 with probability one, for
all ω2i , ri, and σ
2
i .
This implies that, when xj is fixed and equal to zero, analyst i has a dominant strategy
of choosing arbitrarily small xi > 0 and inducing analyst j to forecast at time 0 with
probability one. This is summarized in the following lemma:
Lemma 3 When xj = 0, then analyst i chooses xi = δ, where δ > 0 and arbitrarily small,
for all ω2i , ri, and σ
2
i .
When xj > 0, then analyst i must weigh the benefit of inducing analyst j to forecast
earlier with the cost of not receiving private information. Note that when xj > 0, analyst
i will either choose xi > xj or xi = 0, since analyst i receives a strictly higher expected
payoff by setting xi = 0 than xi ∈ (0, xj). To focus on the dynamics and economic forces










4This is not a concern when both analysts are potentially uninformed as the posterior that both analysts
are uninformed goes to one at the same time. However, this is precluded when one analyst is known to be
informed at time 0.
5See Section 6.1 for analysis of information acquisition when analysts are heterogeneous.
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fixed xj > 0, we see that analyst i maximizes her payoff by setting xi as a function of xj
only when xj ≤
1
2 :























where xi > xj when xj ≤
1
2 .
Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that analyst i chooses to be imperfectly informed whenever
xj ≤
1




. When ci = cj , we see




and thus the smaller the ratio, the more likely it is that analyst j issues a forecast at time
0. Increasing xi, however, means that analyst i receives information with lower probability.
Absent a signal, analyst i only forecasts by herding with an informed analyst j’s forecast.





2 , the cost of being potentially uninformed with greater probability dominates
and analyst i is better off receiving information with probability one and forecasting for
sure at time 0. Symmetry of the analysis in the section is also necessary for analytical
tractability, however, in Section 6.1 I examine the case where analysts are heterogeneous.
These preliminary results prove useful when examining the two-sided choice of xi in the
following section.
3.2.2 Two-sided choice of xi
I now consider when both analysts simultaneously choose their endowment probabilities.
First, we see that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies. For example, consider the
case where xj >
1
2 , then, by Lemma 4, analyst i’s best response is xi = 0. However, if
this is the case, then by Lemma 3, analyst j can do strictly better by setting xj = δ <
1
2 ,
in which case analyst i can do strictly better by setting xi > xj. Hence, any equilibrium
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The first term in equation (3.4) is analyst i’s payoff when she selects an xi less than
xj, whereas the second term captures analyst i’s payoff when xi exceeds xj. Let Ψ (x)
denote the cumulative distribution function of the analysts’ symmetric mixed strategy































We see that the gain from xi > xj appears in the second term of equation (3.5), where the
extent of the gain is given by the ratio
xj
xi
. The potential loss from a higher xi appears in
both terms, however, this is somewhat mitigated by the positive probability that analyst
j receives information. A preliminary result concerning the strategy Ψ (x) is given by the
following:
Lemma 5 Ψ(x) is differentiable.
Lemma 5 states that Ψ′ (y) exists and hence the mixing strategy can be expressed
in terms of its probability density function ψ (x), i.e. Ψ (x) =
∫ x
0 ψ (k) dk. The proof of
Lemma 5 also shows that ui is constant for all x ∈ [0, q], as is necessary for analyst i to be
indifferent. Derivations from equation (3.5) lead to an expression for ψ (x). The following
Theorem states one of the central results of the model:
Theorem 1 In the information acquisition stage, there exists a unique symmetric mixing
distribution Ψ(x), in which each analyst i ∈ {1, 2} selects xi according to Ψ(x). In the
forecasting subgame, each analyst follows the strategy as stated in Lemma 1, with {x1, x2}
as specified from the information acquisition stage.
Theorem 1 states that there is a unique mixing strategy that both analysts follow to
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choose their endowment probabilities in the information acquisition stage. This implies
that both analysts will always be imperfectly informed, even though they can receive in-
formation with probability one at zero cost! We see that this arises due to each analyst’s
incentive to induce the other analyst to forecast with higher probability at time 0, that is,
to give the other analyst the atom. Consequently, both analysts choose to be imperfectly
informed in equilibrium. The result implies that the strategic timing of forecasts when
there is an opportunity to herd (or observationally learn) leads to inefficient information
acquisition, even in the face of zero costs of acquiring information. If one accepts the
results from the empirical literature that observational learning among analysts is a ubiq-
uitous and pervasive phenomenon, then the result implies that the very nature of analyst
forecasting leads to inefficient information acquisition when there are multiple analysts
covering a given firm. Theorem 1 also has implications regarding price efficiency, as less
information acquisition results in less efficient prices.
The choice of xi can be considered as an analyst’s decision of how many industries
or firms to follow; as documented by Clement and Tse (2005), analysts who follow more
industries or firms are more likely to herd. In this respect, Theorem 1 helps explain the
trend for analysts to cover more firms or become generalists instead of specialists, as this
gives them an advantage in the forecast timing. Theorem 1 also implies that analysts have
less incentive to acquire information when there is increased analyst following. This implies
that individual forecasts will be less informative and that we should see more uninformed
herding with greater analyst following. In addition, this suggests that increased analyst
following does not necessarily mean a less opaque information environment for the firm.
This has implications for proxy variables relying on analyst following as a measure for firm
transparency. An alternative measure is to use the timeliness of the forecasts, as Corollary
2 shows that analysts forecast earlier when they are more likely to be informed.
The choice of endowment probability can also be thought of as an effort choice of ac-
quiring information that is made by the analyst at the beginning of each earnings quarter.
Observable effort can take the form of scheduled meetings and calls with executives that
may increase the likelihood that the analyst has insightful information. This is equivalent
to a one-to-one mapping, Υ, of a costless effort choice, ei ∈ [e, e], into the endowment
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probability, given as Υ : [e, e] 7→ [0, 1], where Υ is strictly increasing in effort. Hence, an
analyst who puts in a high level of effort is more likely to receive to useful information.
The result in Theorem 1 holds under this alternative formulation as well–analysts choose
an inefficient effort level, even though effort is costless, in order to be imperfectly informed.
Note that the results are qualitatively unchanged if information acquisition was assumed
to be costly; analysts still choose an inefficient level of acquisition when there are multiple
analysts.
In addition, the analysts’ choice of informedness can be considered in terms of employ-
ment, where higher informedness corresponds to an analyst’s choice of employment at a
boutique research firm which specializes in a particular industry or at a brokerage firm
which places significant emphasis on their research division. Hence, this helps to explain
why some analysts may join a brokerage house or investment-banking firm whose research
division has limited resources. Similarly, we can consider this from a brokerage house
or investment-banking firm’s perspective, as they may allocate fewer resources into their
research division.
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Chapter 4
Forecasting with Bias
The previous section examines analyst forecast timing when analysts may be probabilis-
tically informed, receive imprecise information, and can acquire information. Although
these are practically relevant features of analyst forecasting, we have also seen through a
voluminous literature that analysts generally issue biased forecasts (see Kothari (2001) for
a review). However, very few studies to date, to the best of my knowledge, have examined
endogenous analyst forecast timing when analysts may be potentially biased.1 A number
of models attribute this bias to arising from trading commissions (e.g. Jackson (2005),
Beyer and Guttman (2011)) or to curry favor with management (e.g. Das et al. (1998),
Lim (2001)). In this section I show how analyst bias may arise also from the strategic
considerations stemming from the endogenous timing of forecasts.
I first examine the model when the potential bias is exogenously given, and then





analyst i’s utility function relies on issuing a forecast with an upward bias, and with



















with probability 1− pi,
1One exception is Xue (2015), who considers a forecasting model with an analyst who has a known
bias and an unbiased analyst. Among several differences, the setting here allows for two-sided bias and
bias acquisition. See Section 1.1 for a more detailed discussion of Xue (2015) in relation with this study.
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where bi > 0 is a bias term and all other terms are defined as in Section 2. That is,
analyst i has bias bi with probability pi and is unbiased with probability 1 − pi (similar
to Morgan and Stocken (2003) and Meng (2015)), and I assume that pi and bi are such




j = 0 so
that an informed analyst perfectly observes the value of her segment. The analysis follows


















j is the expected forecast error an informed analyst i incurs after observing
analyst j’s potentially biased forecast. We see from equation (4.1) that the higher the
forecast error from analyst j’s potential bias, p2jb
2
j , the lower is analyst i’s option value
of waiting. The derivation of the equilibrium forecasting behavior when analysts are
potentially biased is similar to that of Lemma 1. Note that, unlike with xi, there is no
updating on the probability that the analyst is biased as both the biased and unbiased
analyst follow the same strategy for their forecast time. We see this in the RHS of equation
(4.1), where analyst j, regardless of whether or not she is biased, mixes in accordance with
the expected forecast error analyst i retains after observing a forecast from analyst j. The
following result presents the equilibrium:
Proposition 1 There is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the forecasting subgame
when analysts are potentially biased where (i) an uninformed analyst forecasts if and only
if a forecast by the other analyst is made; (ii) both informed types will have forecasted by
time T = min
{





; and (iii) the strategy profiles for informed types
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are given by:
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Proposition 1 captures the unique forecasting equilibrium when analysts are potentially





analyst i. As in the equilibrium in Lemma 1, when the final forecast times are misaligned,
one analyst must forecast with discrete probability at time 0 to align the path of beliefs.
Moreover, the relative biases determine the size of the atom at time 0. When Ti > Tj ,
then analyst i forecasts with probability 1− x
−ci/cj
j xi at time 0, and hence the greater is
p2jb
2




i , the greater the probability that analyst i issues a forecast at time 0.
We see how this arises from the local incentive constraint in equation (4.1). When p2jb
2
j is
high, analyst i has a lower option value of waiting, and thus analyst j’s mixing strategy
must entail a higher rate of forecasting at every time t to keep analyst i indifferent. The
higher mixing rate leads analyst j to reach her terminal time more quickly than analyst
i, i.e. Tj < Ti. Therefore, to align the terminal times, analyst i has an atom at time 0.
This leads to the following ordering according to the potential bias:
Proposition 2 Ceteris paribus, the forecasting time is earlier when analysts are more
biased (T is decreasing in pibi), and the analyst who is less biased forecasts earlier with
higher probability.
Proposition 2 shows that the overall forecasting time by informed analysts is earlier
when analysts are more biased, and that the terminal time for forecasts speeds up as
just one of the analysts becomes more biased. We also see that the less biased analyst
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forecasts earlier in equilibrium. This occurs since the less biased analyst forecasts with
discrete probability at time 0 to align the path of beliefs. Moreover, the greater the bias
of analyst j, the higher the likelihood that analyst i issues a forecast at time 0.
Proposition 2 implies that analysts can benefit from bias if it induces their peer to
forecast earlier. As in the preceding section, I now endogenize pi by allowing analysts
to simultaneously choose pi in the first stage of time 0. In the second stage, pi becomes
publicly revealed and analysts privately learn whether they are informed, their signal (if
they are informed), and whether they have a conflict of interest (i.e. if their utility depends
on bi). The analysts then continue in the third stage of time 0 with the forecasting subgame
where time proceeds continuously. Moreover, I assume that xi = xj, σi = σj , and ri = rj
to focus on the analyst’s acquisition of bias.
The choice of bias probability, pi, can be interpreted as the analyst’s choice of em-
ployment, such as a brokerage house, investment banking firm, or independent research
institution. Several studies suggest that analysts face a potential conflict of interest when
employed at the former two, and document that these analysts typically issue distorted
forecasts (e.g. Dugar and Nathan (1995), Lin and McNichols (1997), Michaely and Wom-
ack (1999), Mola and Guidolin (2009)). Thus, an analyst who chooses a high pi can
be thought of as affiliated and has joined the research division within a brokerage house,
whereas analysts who choose a low pi can be thought of as independent or whose firms have
a reputation for maintaining the “Chinese wall.” The equilibrium when pi is endogenously
chosen is stated in the following result:
Theorem 2 In the bias acquisition stage, the equilibrium choice of p is
(i) pi = 0, pj =
1
2 if bi < bj,
(ii) pi =
1
2 , pj = 0 if bi > bj,
(iii) pi =
1
2 , pj = 0 or pi = 0, pj =
1
2 if bi = bj,
and the equilibrium forecasting strategies are given as in Proposition 1.
When analysts are able to choose their level of bias or the likelihood to which their
payoff depends on a biased report, we see that analysts have a natural incentive to choose
positive levels of each due to the equilibrium effects in the forecasting subgame. However,
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the analyst who would receive the compensation with a greater bias, bi, has an advantage
over the other. We see that the unique outcome when bi 6= bj is where the analyst with
the higher bi sets pi =
1
2 to induce the other analyst to forecast earlier. Moreover, pi =
1
2
maximizes the probability of a time 0 forecast by analyst j when bi > bj . When the
bias levels are equal, bi = bj, we have two asymmetric equilibria where one chooses the
maximum bias likelihood and the other sets this likelihood to zero. Note that the results
of Theorem 2 would be qualitatively identical if analysts were allowed to choose the bias
level bi while keeping pi fixed.
The above result also provides a theoretical justification for an analyst’s choice of
employment for which she may encounter a conflict of interest. Theorem 2 states that the
choice of affiliation arises due to the strategic advantage the analyst gains in the forecasting
subgame from having a larger potential bias.
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Chapter 5
Empirical Implications
5.1 Relation to existing empirical studies
The results help elucidate a number of empirical regularities documented in the literature.
As shown in Corollaries 1 and 2, analysts are more likely to be the leading forecasters
when they have comparatively more precise information or a higher likelihood of receiving
information. This corresponds to the findings of Cooper et al. (2001), Clement and
Tse (2005), and Keskek et al. (2014), who find that analysts with superior information
or greater forecasting ability issue more timely forecasts. Interestingly, the results of the
model concerning the time 0 forecast by the more precise analyst almost exactly correspond
to the findings of Keskek et al. (2014). They find ”that the timing of individual analysts’
forecasts within an information production phase is strongly related to forecast quality”
(p. 1507). The time 0 forecast by one of the analysts occurs at the end of the information
production/discovery stage of the model, and is made by the analyst with comparatively
more precise information. Indeed, the economic forces driving the results of the model–that
more precise analysts have a lower option of waiting–seem to govern analysts’ behavior in
practice.
The corresponding empirical results concerning follower or herding analysts are also
captured by the model. As Hong et al. (2000), Clement and Tse (2005), and Jegadeesh
and Kim (2010) find, herding analysts are more likely to be of weaker ability. Recall that
the likelihood of receiving information corresponds to an analyst’s level of specialization
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or focus; analysts who are particularly specialized, or who work in specialized research
departments, are more likely to receive information than analysts who follow multiple
industries or who can be considered generalists. Moreover, the model shows that pure
imitation herding occurs only by uninformed analysts, who simply repeat the forecast (or
the ”consensus”) made by the leader. This is in line with the results of Jegadeesh and
Kim (2010), and particularly of Clement and Tse (2005), who document this phenomenon
as ”uninformed herding” (p. 310), and find that analysts who follow more industries are
more likely to herd. The results also help to explain the general trend for analysts to cover
more firms. The results give an endogenous explanation for why some analysts become
generalists and others specialists, as it is driven by strategic considerations in the forecast
timing.
The results capture several other important properties of analyst forecasting. As docu-
mented in Cooper et al. (2001), timeliness of the forecast is a more informative indication
of an analyst’s forecasting ability rather than the forecast error. The results of the model
confirm Cooper et al. (2001)’s conclusions as the more precise analyst forecasts earlier,
even though her resulting forecast error may be higher than the subsequent analysts who
issue less timely forecasts. Furthermore, Cooper et al. (2001) find that leaders have a
greater market impact than followers. The results of the model imply that an analyst
leader will always be informed, thus conveying material information and inciting a market
reaction, whereas the follower analyst may sometimes be uninformed and thus issuing a
forecast that has little effect. Likewise, a follower may also be informed, albeit with a lower
precision, and thus will sometimes elicit a market reaction. The latter effect is evidenced
by Shroff et al. (2014), who find that the forecasts of follower analysts can also contain
useful information.
This study is also relevant to the empirical papers investigating the properties and in-
teractions of affiliated and independent analysts. We see from Proposition 2 that affiliated
or biased analysts are more likely to observe material information of the other analysts
before forecasting, which implies that affiliated analysts should have a lower forecast er-
ror than independent analysts. This phenomenon is documented by Jacob et al. (1999)
and Jacob et al. (2008), who find that affiliated analysts issue more accurate forecasts
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than independent analysts. We also see that affiliated analysts have a lower forecast error
when independent/unbiased analysts are also following the firm, which comports with the
findings of Gu and Xue (2008). The results also correspond to the findings of Das et al.
(1998), where analysts issue more biased forecasts when public information is weaker.
5.2 Empirical predictions
A number of empirical predictions emerge from the analysis in this study. The results
imply that the posterior probability that an analyst is uninformed increases over time as
she delays issuing her forecast. This implies that analysts who forecast after the leader are
more likely to exhibit uninformed herding at later stages in the forecasting period rather
than earlier. Hence, one empirical prediction is that clustering of forecasts that occurs
later contains less information than clustering which emerges earlier. Moreover, herding
which occurs later will be more in line with an informational cascade rather than herding
which occurs earlier, which would rather be closer to observational learning. This also
implies that forecasts of follower analysts will induce less market reaction when made in
a later stage rather than earlier.
The results also suggest several predictions concerning the overall timing and speed to
which forecasts are made. When a single highly informed analyst is following the firm, the
forecasting time for all analysts who cover the firm should be earlier. Moreover, as we see
in Corollary 1, the timeliness of forecasts crucially depends on the precision of the most
informed analyst, rather than on the number of analysts who are covering the firm. Hence,
the ability of the lead analysts dictate the overall forecast timing, rather than the number
of analysts. Similarly, Corollary 2 implies that the overall timeliness of the forecasts
improves with the specialization of the lead analysts. Thus, if one highly specialized
analyst is following the firm, this should significantly improve the overall forecasting times
of all the analysts who are following the same firm.
Several paradoxical or counter-intuitive predictions also emerge. The results in Theo-
rem 1 imply that individual analysts will have higher forecast errors when more analysts
are following the firm. This occurs since the strategic forecast timing induces less informa-
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tion acquisition by an analyst when other analysts are following the same firm. Hence, we
should see relatively less accurate forecasts and more uninformed herding when the firm
has a greater analyst following. The results in Theorem 2 imply that the level of bias or
distortion in the forecasts should be relatively higher when more analysts are following the
firm. We thus have the empirical prediction that firms who have a higher analyst following
can be met with forecasts which entail comparatively greater uninformed herding, greater
bias, and less accuracy. This suggests that analyst following may not necessarily be in-
dicative of the transparency of a firm’s information environment. As described shortly, an
alternative measure is the timeliness of forecasts.
Furthermore, the results imply that independent or unaffiliated analysts issue more
timely forecasts. The expected forecasting times for all analysts following a firm should be
earlier when the firm is followed by affiliated analysts, and the speed of the overall fore-
casting times has a monotonic relation with the level of bias of the affiliated analysts. For
example, the results imply that forecasts are made in a more timely fashion and informa-
tion aggregation should occur more quickly when analysts affiliated with the underwriting
bank are following a recently public firm after its IPO quiet period.
The results also have implications for the firm’s informational environment. The re-
sults imply that the timeliness of analysts’ forecasts, rather than the number of analysts
following the firm, is a more suitable measure for the strength or transparency of a firm’s
informational environment. This follows from three distinct implications of the model:
(i) Corollaries 1 and 2 show that the forecasting time is earlier when analysts have more
precise information and when they are more likely to be informed, respectively; (ii) The-
orem 1 implies that increased analyst following may not necessarily lead to a reduction
in information asymmetry; and (iii) Corollary 3 shows that forecasts will be more timely
as public information improves. Taken together, there is a strong theoretical argument
that the timeliness of forecasts may be more informative than analyst following of the
opaqueness of a firm’s informational environment.
There are also predictions concerning the role of public information on the timing of
analysts’ forecasts. For multi-segmented firms, the results imply that analysts who spe-
cialize in the industry/segment with worse public information will forecast earlier than
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analysts who are following the same firm but whose industry specialization has compara-
tively stronger public information. However, the overall forecasting time of both analysts
in a multi-segmented firm is always expedited as public information improves (in either
segment).
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Chapter 6
Extensions
6.1 Information acquisition with heterogeneous analysts
In the information acquisition model of section 3.2, I assumed that analysts were ex
ante symmetric to highlight the economic forces driving information acquisition as well
as to make the analysis analytically tractable for the two-sided acquisition choice. In
this section, I allow analysts to be heterogeneous when there is a one-sided information






j , or ri 6= rj). This substantially complexifies
the analysis and the two-sided acquisition choice under this setting is no longer tractable,
however, even the one-sided acquisition choice shows very interesting properties when
there are heterogeneous analysts.
In the one-sided acquisition choice, assume that analyst i must choose her endowment
likelihood, 1−xi, when analyst j’s endowment probability, 1−xj , is fixed and within (0, 1).
In the homogeneous case, analyst i can induce analyst j to have the atom by setting xi even
slightly higher than xj. However, under heterogeneity, this no longer holds. For example,
if an informed analyst i receives an ex ante more precise signal, she may still have the
mass point at time zero even if xi > xj . Similarly, if her discount rate, ri or the ex ante
variance of her distribution, σ2i , is sufficiently higher (see Corollary 3), analyst i may still
have the mass point when xi is above xj. Hence, under heterogeneity, analyst i’s strategy
is to choose xi sufficiently larger than xj such that this compensates for the difference in,
for example, their relative signal precisions so as to induce analyst j to forecast at time
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0 with discrete probability. However, if the requisite xi to induce analyst j’s atom is too
high so that it becomes unprofitable for analyst i, she would then rather set xi = 0 and
forecast immediately. Likewise, if the parameters are such that analyst j has the mass
point ex ante (for example, if analyst j’s signal is much more precise than analyst i’s),
then xi will be determined so as to maximize analyst j’s mass point at time 0.
Let u0i ≡ ui (xi = 0) be analyst i’s expected utility from setting xi = 0 and forecasting




j . Similarly, let u
∗
i ≡ ui (xi = x
∗
i ) denote expected
utility for analyst i when she she sets her endowment probability to x∗i . When analysts
are allowed to be heterogeneous, the optimal information acquisition choice by analyst i
is given by the following Proposition:






























































i , and ri.
The above Proposition states that analyst i sets xi according to equation (6.1) when
it is profitable to induce analyst j to have the atom at time 0. Otherwise, she chooses
to be perfectly informed and forecast immediately with probability one. If analyst i has
the mass point ex ante (for example, if ω2i < ω
2
j ), then she will either set xi = x
∗
i > xj
to induce analyst j to have the mass point instead of herself, or set xi = 0 if the ex ante
discrepancy is sufficiently large such that it becomes unprofitable (since xi must be set
very high) to induce analyst j to have the mass point.
Proposition 3 can perhaps be more easily understood through the use of a numerical
example. I focus on the more interesting case in which analyst i has the mass point at time
zero ex ante. For the example, suppose that the analysts are heterogeneous in the precision
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Table 6.1: Optimal xi when ω
2
i = 4, ω
2










xj = 0.01 0.32 9.03 13.82 6.58 4 0 0.80
xj = 0.05 0.48 5.83 8.99 5.01 4 0 0.65
xj = 0.1 0.57 4.52 6.91 4.17 4 0 0.55
xj ≥ 0.115 0 0 ≤ 6.49 < 4 4 1 0
of their signals (as denoted by the conditional variance ω2i ) when informed. Specifically,
let ω2i = 4 and ω
2
j = 6, while the other parameters are symmetric: s = 20, ri = rj =
1
2 ,
and σ2i = σ
2
j = 12.
1 In this example, if xi = xj, then analyst i would have the mass point
at time 0 according to Corollary 1. We have that
cj
ci















. Let αi denote the time 0 mass point for analyst i and αj
similarly for analyst j. Table 6.1 shows the optimal xi for varying values of xj.
This example highlights very interesting properties of the optimal information acqui-
sition choice with heterogeneous analysts. First, we see that the xi required to overcome
analyst i’s precision advantage is always significantly higher than xj. Analyst i must adopt
a substantially higher likelihood of not receiving information so as to reduce the option
value of waiting for analyst j. This then increases analyst j’s time at which her posterior
goes to 1, Tj, thus leading analyst j to have the mass point at time 0 rather than analyst
i (since Tj > Ti). Second, we see that this strategy of being substantially uninformed is
optimal for analyst i. Specifically, when xj = 0.1, analyst i chooses to be uninformed with
57% probability, which gives her an expected payoff higher than that of being informed
with probability one. Third, we see that the threshold level at which analyst i chooses to
be informed with probability one is reached much more quickly than if analysts were ex
ante homogeneous. In the example above, analyst i chooses to be perfectly informed and
forecast immediately whenever xj exceeds 0.1. This is in contrast to the symmetric case






necessary to induce analyst
i to set xi = 0. The reason for this is related to the first property of the example–that xi
must significantly exceed xj in order to compensate for analyst i’s ex ante precision ad-
1This is primarily for expositional ease. The numerical results are qualitatively similar if analysts are
also heterogeneous in r and σ2.
CHAPTER 6. EXTENSIONS 39
vantage. As xj increases, analyst i must adopt a comparatively higher probability of being
uninformed to induce analyst j to have the mass point, however, this becomes unprofitable
at some point for analyst i as it rather lowers her expected payoff.
Lastly, this example shows the downward pattern in analyst i’s expected utility as
analyst j becomes less informed (as xj increases). This occurs as analyst i can induce a
relatively larger mass point for lower levels of xj (i.e. αj is decreasing in xj), and also
since analyst j’s relatively lower endowment probability has a direct effect on analyst i’s
expected utility. It is also interesting to note from this example that the requisite xi
necessary for analyst j to have the mass point becomes larger as analyst i’s precision
advantage increases. Consequently, this leads to a lower xj threshold necessary to induce
analyst i to choose to be perfectly informed. This is apparent if we rather have ω2i = 2 in
the numerical example. In this case, the threshold where xi = 0 is reached is with a much
lower threshold xj. Similar examples can be shown for when analysts are heterogeneous in
the variances of their distributions and in their discount rates. Although the analysis in the
two-sided acquisition choice is no longer tractable with heterogenous analysts, one-sided
acquisition under heterogeneity preserves the equilibrium features of the homogeneous
model and also provides additional insights.
6.2 Compensation depends on forecast order
As noted by Groysberg, Healy, and Maber (2011), analysts are rewarded for issuing timely
forecasts through promotions and trading commissions from increased volume. In the
baseline model, timeliness of the forecast is captured by the discounted compensation the
analyst earns when she delays the forecast. An analyst who forecasts earlier saves on the
discounting costs, however, they are not necessarily rewarded more for forecasting first.
To emphasize the importance of timeliness, I allow for the analyst’s salary to vary by
the order in which she forecasted and examine the equilibrium effects in the forecasting
subgame. Specifically, the analysts’ utility function is given by:
ui =
[
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where k ∈ {L,F}. The leader receives a salary sL, and the follower receives sF , where
sL > sF > σ
2
i and sL < σ
2








j = 0, so that
informed analysts receive a perfect signal of the value of their segment vi, however, the
results in this section would not be qualitatively affected if signals were imperfect and
with different variances. The remaining structure is the same as in the baseline model.
Each analyst now has a lower option value of waiting given the difference in salaries.






e−rit = βj (t)hj (t)∆t (sF ) e
−rit (6.2)







We see from equation (6.2) that analyst j must forecast with a higher rate since the LHS
is now relatively larger. The equilibrium of the forecast subgame is given as:
Proposition 4 When the analysts’ compensations are determined by the forecast order,
the equilibrium of the forecasting subgame consists of strategies (Fi (t) , Fj (t)) as defined in














rj. The overall forecasting
terminal time is decreasing in the difference sL − sF .
Because the option value of waiting is lower, each analyst must mix with a higher
rate of forecasting to keep the other analyst indifferent in equilibrium. This consequently
lowers the overall forecasting time. Moreover, the forecasts are more quickly issued as the
reward for forecasting first increases. This is expected as the option value of waiting is
decreasing in the difference sL− sF . We see that delay continues to persist in the forecast
time, as the option value of waiting is positive. However, delay vanishes in the limit where
sL − sF → σ
2
i , since the value of waiting then tends to zero. The equilibrium of the
information acquisition subgame remains qualitatively unaffected.
Note that this alternative specification is equivalent to a setting where an analyst who
forecasts first is punished less severely in terms of the disutility they receive from the
forecast error, i.e. if the utility function was rather:
ui =
[
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this case, the leader’s forecast error has a coefficient αL, whereas the coefficient on the
forecast error is αF for the follower. This specification conveys the intuitive notion that
analysts who forecast early may be punished less severely for inaccuracies as relatively
less information is available at the time of their forecast. This setting is equivalent to the
preceding specification where the analysts’ compensation depends on the forecast order
and yields qualitatively identical results to Proposition 4 and to the results in Section 3.
6.3 Alternative value function
The baseline model assumes that the total value of the firm, V , is the sum of the values of
two segments: V = v1 + v2. I impose this structure to allow for general and heterogenous
distributions of vi, however, the results in both the forecasting subgame and informa-
tion acquisition subgame are qualitatively unaffected under alternative value structures.
Specifically, if we have a single segment, V = v , where each analyst receives an imperfect
signal, yi = v + εi, with some probability 1 − xi, then the results go through as long as
the conditional variance of v is decreasing in the number of signals and does not depend
on the value of yi.










, where σ2εi > 0. As
in the baseline case, each analyst is informed with probability 1 − xi and has a payoff
function as in equation (2.1). Let ω2i denote the conditional variance for an informed
analyst i who observes yi = v + εi, i.e. ω
2
i = (E (v|yi)− v)
2, where ω2i < s < σ
2
v . Let
φ2 denote the conditional variance for an informed analyst who observes both y1 and
y2, i.e. φ
2 = (E (v|y1, y2)− v)
2. We see that each analyst has an incentive to delay her
forecast to observe the forecast of her peer, as φ2 < ω2i . I assume that the signals are
independent, however, the results would not be qualitatively affected if there is correlation.
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The analysis is qualitatively similar to the baseline case. Moreover, the properties of the
forecast order are preserved in this setting as well. The equilibrium of the forecasting
subgame is given in the following result:
Proposition 5 When the firm value and signals are joint normal, the equilibrium of the









rj . The corresponding results in Corollaries 1, 2, 3,
and Theorem 1 continue to hold.
The proof of Proposition 5 proceeds similarly from the results in Section 3. We see that
the option value of waiting is given by the decrease in the forecast error from observing the
other analyst’s forecast, ω2i − φ
2, and that this determines the mixing rate. Proposition 5
also states that the forecast order is still determined by the analysts’ relative precision and
likelihoods of receiving information; all else equal, the analyst with a lower ω2i forecasts
earlier and the analyst with a higher 1 − xi forecasts earlier. The equilibrium of the
information acquisition stage is qualitatively unaffected as well, since analysts continue
to have an incentive to receive information with probability less than one in order to
induce the other analyst to forecast earlier. The results concerning forecasting with a
potential bias and bias acquisition as shown in Section 4 continue to hold under this
alternative specification as well. The normal framework is used in the following subsection
to explore the model’s robustness when informational content of the forecast is included
in the analysts’ payoff function.
6.4 Compensation depends on informational content of fore-
cast
The baseline model captures the importance of accuracy through the squared error of the
analyst’s forecast. This depicts an analyst’s incentive to disseminate accurate information
to their buy-side clients and retail investors. It can also be argued that an analyst’s
compensation or payoff also relies on the informational content of the report, that is,
the new information (or interpretation/insight) that an analyst brings to the market. As
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mentioned previously (see footnote 2), analysts may obtain useful information from other
analysts in other non-public channels before the forecasts have been widely distributed
(e.g. through their common buy-side clients). However, it may also be the case that
analysts are rewarded on the market impact/reaction of their report or on completely new
information that they contribute.











, where σ2εi > 0, and each analyst, if informed, receives a signal yi = v + εi.
The information content of the forecast can be captured as in Admati and Pfleiderer
(1986) and Guttman (2010). Let πi ≡
1
ω2i
denote the conditional precision of an informed
analyst i’s forecast, and let ρt ≡
1
ϕ2t
denote the precision of publicly available information.








Note that ρt is constant except when a forecast is released by one of the analysts. Since
there is no further private information gathering by either analyst after time 0, πi is fixed
but ρt may increase after a forecast is released. To examine the effects of information




s+ Ct − (mi − V )
2
]
e−riτi · I. (6.5)
In this case, there is an additional benefit in forecasting early, as Ct is relatively larger for
the analyst that forecasts first. However, the benefit of learning from the other analyst is
maintained through the disutility in the forecast error. Hence, the payoff structure in equa-
tion (6.5) is qualitatively equivalent to that in Section 6.2, as there is an additional benefit
to the leader. It is straightforward to show that the qualitative equilibrium properties of
Section 2 are preserved under this alternative utility structure as well. Thus, compensa-
tion partly based on the informational contribution of the forecast does not qualitatively
affect the results when analysts prefer to have a lower forecast error.
CHAPTER 6. EXTENSIONS 44
6.4.1 Endogenous payoff function
As shown by Admati and Pfleiderer (1986) and Guttman (2010), equation (6.4) can be
derived endogenously from the payoff that an analyst receives from selling her forecast to
an uninformed investor. The same argument can be applied here to endogenously generate
the analyst’s payoff function, discounted to the time in which she issues her forecast:
ui = Cte
−riτi · I, (6.6)
where the risk aversion parameter in Guttman (2010) is set to γ = 12 and where signals
and values are normally distributed as in Section 6.3 (i.e. an informed analyst receives










, where σ2εi > 0). Under the
payoff structure in equation (6.6), an additional assumption on the information structure is
necessary to capture analysts’ observational learning from their peers. For example, there
may exist complementarities in the analysts’ information sets such that the precision of
analyst i’s signal is improved upon observing the forecast and learning the information
of analyst j. This may happen, for instance, when analysts have different comparative
advantages and backgrounds such that the information released by one analyst may help
with the discovery, analysis, or interpretation of the information of another analyst. For
example, suppose analyst 1 specializes in firm-specific expertise and analyst 2’s advantage
is with overall industry expertise. A report/forecast by analyst 2 on the financial soundness
of major suppliers or customers may allow analyst 1 to better assess the firm’s long-run
strategy and direction, thus allowing her to make a more accurate forecast.
To capture complementarity in the information sets of the two analysts, we can assume
that the errors, ε1 and ε2, covary so that there is additional benefit to observing the
forecast, and thus the signal, of the other analyst, i.e. by setting cov (ε1, ε2) = c 6= 0.
2
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In this case, the results of the baseline model are qualitatively preserved as long as there
is sufficient reduction in the conditional variance of analyst i’s signal upon observing the
forecast of analyst j. Alternatively, complementarities can be depicted as in Kim and
Verrechia (1994, 1997), where each informed analyst receives a private signal of the firm’s
value or earnings, yi = v+εi, as well as an additional signal regarding the error of the other




. In this case, the signal Oi is
only helpful to analyst i if she observes the forecast of analyst j, thus giving her additional
information beyond the signal of analyst j, represented as yi,O ≡ yj − Oi = v + δi. For
example, analyst i has private information regarding the random error in analyst j’s report
due to her understanding of analyst j’s firm or information discovery/analysis methods
(e.g. the model that analyst j uses to generate her forecasted numbers). This plausible
alternative information structure also generates benefits to observational learning by the
analysts when σ2δi is sufficiently low (and similarly for σ
2
δj
). The qualitative equilibrium
properties under this utility and information structure are also preserved as the economic
forces driving the model–the benefit to waiting and from inducing more timely forecasting
by the other analyst–continue to hold.
One should note, however, that the above specifications do not generate significant
insights beyond the utility representation in the baseline model and also cause the anal-
ysis to be far more algebraically cumbersome. Nevertheless, these alternative utility and
information structures allow the payoff function to be endogenized from an investor’s de-
mand for information and demonstrate that the results are robust to alternative modeling
specifications.
6.5 Commitment to forecasting time
The baseline model assumes that analysts are not committed to any particular forecast
time and can issue their forecast as time proceeds. However, it is plausible that an analyst
may announce the date in which she expects to release her forecast, and thus, in some
or, in the case of negative covariance,
c < −σ2i − 2σ
2
v.
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sense, committing ex ante to a forecast time. In this extension, I consider the alternative
model in which analysts publicly announce a forecast time to which they are committed
and cannot issue a forecast at any other time. I first examine the case in which the
selection of forecast times is sequential, where analyst j selects her forecast time τj and
then, having observed τj, analyst i selects her forecast time τi. Under this setting, analyst
j will choose her forecast time τj in order to induce analyst i to forecast immediately.
That is, she will set τj such that analyst i finds it more profitable to set τi = 0 rather than









≤ s− ω2i − σ
2
j , (6.7)










≥ s− σ2i − ω
2
j .
If the above condition does not hold, then analyst j sets τj = 0 and analyst i sets τi = ε,
as any τj < τ
∗
j will induce analyst i to set τi = τj + ε. In this case, analyst j can do
strictly better by forecasting immediately. This analysis assumes that both analysts are
perfectly informed, however, endogenizing information acquisition leads to a similar result
as the main result of the baseline model. If there is some probability xi that analyst i is

















≥ s− σ2i − ω
2
j .
Similarly, if analyst j was also probabilistically uninformed, a lower forecast time would
be required to satisfy equation (6.7). In this case, the equilibrium information acquisition
strategy again involves mixing over xi.
In the case where the selection of the committed forecast time is simultaneous, the
equilibrium entails mixing over the selection of τi. This is similar to the argument made
in Claim 1–no two pure strategy forecast times can be mutual best responses. Information
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acquisition is less clear in this context though it seems to be the case that it remains to be
inefficient if it leads to more density over lower values of τi in the forecast time selection
stage.
6.6 Learning over time
In the baseline model, analysts can only learn their private information at time 0, at which
point they are either informed or uninformed. However, it may be the case that analysts
receive information at different points in time and can also learn new private information
by delaying their forecast. In this section, I extend the baseline setting by allowing analysts
to learn information over time. Suppose information arrives for each analyst according to
a Poisson process with intensity λ. The remaining structure is the same as in the baseline
model, where V = v1 + v2, analysts have utility as in equation (2.1), and yi = vi. The
signal and the arrival time T are privately observed by each analyst. The arrival time is
thus exponentially distributed, where the probability of being informed for each analyst
is:
Ω (t) = 1− e−λt.
We see that delay by an informed analyst will be present in this setting as well. I conjecture
that an analyst who learns information at time T will wait an additional amount of time
t (T ) before forecasting, where t (T ) is the delay strategy based on the arrival time T . The
time the forecast is issued is thus T+t (T ). There are two simplifying conditions regarding
a symmetric pure strategy t (T ). The first is that an analyst who receives information at
time 0 will issue her forecast immediately, i.e. t (0) = 0. The benefit of delaying the
forecast is the option value of observing the other analyst’s forecast. If t (T ) ≥ t (T ′), then
an analyst can only observe the forecast of those who received information before them.
Thus, an informed analyst at time 0 can only learn information if the other analyst was
also informed at time 0. However, the option value in this case is zero since the event
has zero probability. Alternatively, if t (0) > t (T ′), where T ′ > 0, this would contradict
the single-crossing condition necessary for a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium. This
implies that t (T ) is increasing, at least initially, and is never strictly decreasing for all T .
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According to the strategy t (T ), an analyst who receives information at time T can
only observe the forecast of an analyst who received information between time T − t (u)
and time T . An analyst who received information prior to time T − t (u) would have
already forecasted, and an analyst who receives information after time T will delay their
forecast until some time after T + t (T ). Therefore, the relevant interval for an informed
analyst i at time T is the probability of information arrival for analyst j in the interval
[u+ t (u) , T ]. Let k (u) = u + t (u) ≡ T , and so k−1 (T ) = u. For notational ease, let










The first term in equation (6.8) is analyst i’s expected payoff from waiting an addi-
tional time t (T ) before forecasting and observing the other analyst’s forecast. The second
term is analyst i’s expected payoff from waiting until time T + t (T ) and not observing
analyst j’s forecast.
The solution to the problem involves solving for the functional form of the delay period,
t (T ). However, this is unfortunately analytically intractable without imposing further
conditions. Suppose we can set a blocked interval, where analysts may learn information
but are prohibited from issuing a forecast. This can be thought of as the early stages
of an IPO process, where analysts affiliated with the underwriting banks learn material
information but disclosure is prohibited. Let B denote the end point of the blocked
interval, [0, B). We can thus choose B which induces the strategy t (T ) to be constant for
all arrival times T :
Proposition 6 Suppose there is a time interval where analysts are not able to forecast,









The above Proposition states that the delay time is constant and equal to B when
analysts may learn information but cannot forecast in the interval [0, B). This is a spe-
cial case since analysts who learn information within the blocked interval have the same
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incentives as those who learn information after time B.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
This study offers a unified theory for analyst forecast timing, information acquisition,
and choice of employment. I characterize the unique equilibrium of the forecasting game
to show that the forecast order is determined by the precision of the analysts’ signals,
the likelihood the analysts’ privately receive information, the level of the analysts’ biases,
the public information in the analysts’ segments, and the analysts’ discount rates. The
results capture several significant and interesting properties of the forecast order and
allow for endogenous information acquisition. I show that there exists a unique symmetric
equilibrium for which analysts choose to be imperfectly informed. This occurs due to the
analysts’ incentive to gain a strategic advantage in the forecasting subgame. Similarly,
when the choice of employment is endogenized, one of the analysts chooses to be affiliated
in equilibrium.
The key novelty of the model is that I allow analysts to be probabilistically informed
and analysts choose this probability prior to their forecasting decision. The uncertain
nature of information acquisition is of practical relevance and departs from the extant an-
alyst herding literature. Allowing for uncertainty over the information endowment leads to
number of interesting results that shed light on empirical regularities which have heretofore
not been captured in the theoretical literature. Moreover, the results provide several av-
enues for future research through empirical predictions. The main result captures the link
between an analyst’s primary responsibility of information acquisition/production and the
strategic nature of the forecast timing. The results also provide a theoretical justification
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for an analyst’s choice of affiliated employment.
Suggestions for future theoretical work that build on the model here include endog-
enizing the market’s perception of the analyst’s type in the forecasting game as part of
her compensation. The model assumes that an analyst’s compensation only depends on
her forecast error and timeliness, however, it may be the case that an analyst’s perceived
ability (informed or uninformed) may also have some impact on her compensation. An-
other possible extension includes an exogenous shock to the public information that occurs
either at some known or unknown time. It seems that this would induce further delay by
analysts, or push to immediate forecasting if an analyst’s compensation depends on their
perceived ability. This work provides useful insights on the economic forces which drive
analyst behavior and offers several avenues for future theoretical and empirical research.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 52
Bibliography
[1] Abreu, D., and F. Gul. 2000. “Bargaining and reputation.” Econometrica 60 (1):
85-117.
[2] Admati, A.R., and P. Pfleiderer. 1986. “A monopolistic market for information.”Jour-
nal of Economic Theory 39 (2): 400-438.
[3] Aghamolla, C., and T. Hashimoto. 2015. “Endogenous timing, clustering, and delay
in analyst herding.”Working paper.
[4] Altschuler, D., G. Chen, and J. Zhou. 2015. “Anticipation of management forecasts
and analysts’ private information search.”Review of Accounting Studies 20 (2): 803-
838.
[5] Bernhardt, D., M. Campello, and E. Kutsoati. 2006. “Who herds?”Journal of Finan-
cial Economics 80 (3): 657-675.
[6] Beyer, A., and I. Guttman. 2011. “The effect of trading volume on analysts’ forecast
bias.”The Accounting Review 86 (2): 451-481.
[7] Brown, L.D., A.C. Call, M.B. Clement, and N.Y. Sharp. 2015. “Inside the ‘black box’
of sell-side financial analysts.” Journal of Accounting Research 53 (1): 1-47.
[8] Chamley, C., and D. Gale. 1994. “Information revelation and strategic delay in a
model of investment.”Econometrica 62 (5): 1065-1085.
[9] Chen, Q., andW. Jiang. 2005.“Analysts’ weighting of private and public information.”
Review of Financial Studies 19 (1): 319–355.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 53
[10] Chen, X., Q. Cheng, and K. Lo. 2010. “On the relationship between analyst reports
and corporate disclosures: Exploring the roles of information discovery and interpre-
tation.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 49 (3): 361-381.
[11] Clement, M.B., J. Hales, and Y. Xue. 2011. “Understanding analysts’ use of stock re-
turns and other analysts’ revisions when forecasting earnings.” Journal of Accounting
and Economics 51 (3): 279-299.
[12] Clement, M.B. and S.Y. Tse. 2005. “Financial analyst characteristics and herding
behavior in forecasting.” Journal of Finance 60 (1): 307-341.
[13] Cooper, R.A., T.E. Day, and C.M. Lewis. 2001. “Following the leader: A study of
individual analysts’ earnings forecasts.” Journal of Financial Economics 61 (3): 383-
416.
[14] Das, S., C.B. Levine, and K. Sivaramakrishnan. 1998. “Earnings predictability and
bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts.” The Accounting Review 73 (2): 277-294.
[15] De Bondt, W.F.M., and W.P. Forbes. 1999. “Herding in analyst earnings forecasts:
Evidence from the United Kingdom.” European Financial Management 5 (2): 143-
163.
[16] De Bondt, W., and R. Thaler. 1990. “Do security analysts overreact?” American
Economic Review 80 (2): 52-57.
[17] Dugar, A., and S. Nathan. 1995. “The effect of investment banking relationships on fi-
nancial analysts’ earnings forecasts and investment recommendations.”Contemporary
Accounting Research 12 (1): 131-160.
[18] Easterwood, J., and S. Nutt. 1999. “Inefficiency in analysts’ earnings forecasts: Sys-
tematic misreaction or systematic optimism?” Journal of Finance 54 (5): 1777-1797.
[19] Ertimur, Y., J. Sunder, and S.V. Sunder. 2007. “Measure for measure: The relation
between forecast accuracy and recommendation profitability of analysts.” Journal of
Accounting Research 45 (3): 567-606.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 54
[20] Evans, G.C. 1910. “Volterra’s integral equation of the second kind, with discontinuous
kernel.”Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 11 (4): 393-413.
[21] Fischer, P.E., and P.C. Stocken. 2010. “Analyst information acquisition and commu-
nication.” The Accounting Review 85 (6): 1985-2009.
[22] Francis, J., and D. Philbrick. 1993. “Analysts’ decisions as products of a multi-task
environment.” Journal of Accounting Research 31 (2): 216-230.
[23] Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole. 1986. “A theory of exit in duopoly.” Econometrica 54
(4): 943-960.
[24] Gleason, C.A., and C.M.C. Lee. 2003. “Analyst forecast revisions and market price
discovery.”The Accounting Review 78 (1): 193-225.
[25] Groysberg, B., P. Healy, and D. Maber. 2011. “What drives sell-side analyst com-
pensation at high-status investment banks?” Journal of Accounting Research 49 (4):
969-1000.
[26] Gu, Z. and J. Xue. 2008. “The superiority and disciplining role of independent ana-
lysts.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 45: 289-316.
[27] Gul, F., and R. Lundholm. 1995. “Endogenous timing and the clustering of agents’
decisions.” Journal of Political Economy 103 (5): 1039-1066.
[28] Guttman, I. 2010.“The timing of analysts’ earnings forecasts.”The Accounting Review
85 (2): 513-545.
[29] Hayes, R. 1998. “The impact of trading commission incentives on analyst’s stock
coverage decision and earnings forecasts.” Journal of Accounting Research 36 (2):
299-320.
[30] Hong, H., and J. Kubik. 2003. “Analyzing the analysts: Career concerns and biased
earnings forecasts.” Journal of Finance 58 (1): 313-351.
[31] Hong, H., J. Kubik, and A. Solomon. 2000. “Security analysts’ career concerns and
herding of earnings forecasts.” RAND Journal of Economics 31: 121-144.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 55
[32] Ivkovic, Z., and N. Jegadeesh. 2004. “The timing and value of forecast and recom-
mendation revisions.” Journal of Financial Economics 73: 433-463.
[33] Irvine, P., M. Lipson, and A. Puckett. 2007. “Tipping.” Review of Financial Studies
20 (3): 741-768.
[34] Jackson, A. 2005. “Trade generation, reputation, and sell-side analysts.” Journal of
Finance 60 (2): 673-717.
[35] Jacob, J., T.Z. Lys, and M.A. Neale. 1999. “Expertise in forecasting performance of
security analysts.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 28: 51-82.
[36] Jacob, J., S. Rock, and D. Weber. 2008. “Do non-investment bank analysts make
better earnings forecasts?” Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance 23: 23-60.
[37] Jegadeesh, N., and W. Kim. 2010. “Do analysts herd? An analysis or recommenda-
tions and market reactions.”Review of Financial Studies 23 (2): 901-937.
[38] Keskek, S., S.Y. Tse, and J.W. Tucker. 2014. “Analyst information production and
the timing of annual earnings forecasts.”Review of Accounting Studies 19: 1504-1531.
[39] Kim, K., and F.Z.X. Lee. 2014. “Information acquisition in a war of attrition.”Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Microeconomics 6 (2): 37-78.
[40] Kim, O., and R.E. Verrecchia. 1994. “Market liquidity and volume around earnings
announcements.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 17 (1-2): 41-67.
[41] Kim, O., and R.E. Verrecchia. 1997. “Pre-announcement and event-period private
information.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 24 (3): 395-419.
[42] Kothari, S. 2001. “Capitals research in accounting.” Journal of Accounting and Eco-
nomics 31 (1-3): 105-231.
[43] Kreps, D., and R. Wilson. 1982. “Reputation and imperfect information.” Journal of
Economic Theory 27 (2): 253-279.
[44] Lim, T. 2001. “Rationality and analysts forecast bias.” The Journal of Finance 56
(1): 369-385.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 56
[45] Lin, H., and M. McNichols. 1998. “Underwriting relationships, analysts’ earnings
forecasts and investment recommendations.” Journal of Accounting and Economics
25 (1): 101-127.
[46] Livnat, J., and Y. Zhang. 2012. “Information interpretation or information discovery:
Which role of analysts do investors value more?” Review of Accounting Studies 17:
612-641.
[47] Loh, R.K., and G.M. Mian. 2006. “Do accurate earnings forecasts facilitate superior
investment recommendations?” Journal of Financial Economics 80 (2): 455-483.
[48] Loh, R.K. and R.M. Stulz. 2011. “When are analyst recommendation changes influ-
ential?”Review of Financial Studies 24 (2): 593–627.
[49] McNichols, M., and P. O’Brien. 1997. “Self-selection and analyst coverage.” Journal
of Accounting Research 35 (Supplement): 167-199.
[50] Meng, X. 2015. “Analyst reputation, communication, and information acquisition.”
Journal of Accounting Research 53 (1): 119–173.
[51] Michaely, R., and K. Womack. 1999.“Conflict of interest and credibility of underwriter
analyst recommendations.”Review of Financial Studies 12 (4): 653–686.
[52] Mikhail, M., B. Walther, and R. Willis. 1999. “Does forecast accuracy matter to
security analysts?” The Accounting Review 74 (2): 185-200.
[53] Mola, S., and M. Guidolin. 2009. “Affiliated mutual funds and analyst optimism.”
Journal of Financial Economics 93 (1): 108-137.
[54] Morgan, J., and P. Stocken. 2003. “An analysis of stock recommendations.” RAND
Journal of Economics 34 (1): 183–203.
[55] Ottaviani, M., and P.N. Sørenson. 2006. “Reputational Cheap Talk.”RAND Journal
of Economics 37 (1): 155–175.
[56] Ponsati, C., and J. Sakovics. 1995.“The war of attrition with incomplete information.”
Mathematical Social Sciences 29 (3): 239-254.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 57
[57] Raedy, J., P. Shane, and S. Yang. 2006. “Horizon-dependent underreaction in financial
analysts’ earnings forecasts.” Contemporary Accounting Research 23 (1): 291-322.
[58] Scharfstein, D. S., and J.C. Stein. 1990. “Herd behavior and investment.” American
Economic Review 80 (3): 465-479.
[59] Schipper, K. 1991. “Analysts’ forecasts.” Accounting Horizons 5 (4): 105-121.
[60] Shroff, P., R. Venkataraman, and B. Xin. 2014. “Timeliness of analysts’ forecasts:
The information content of delayed forecasts.”Contemporary Accounting Research 31
(1): 202-229.
[61] Soltes, E. 2014. “Private interaction between firm management and sell-side analysts.”
Journal of Accounting Research 52 (1): 245-272.
[62] Stickel, S. 1992. “Reputation and performance among security analysts.”The Journal
of Finance 47 (5): 1811–1836.
[63] Trueman, B. 1994. “Analyst forecasts and herding behavior.” Review of Financial
Studies 7 (1): 97-214.
[64] von Wolfersdorf, L. 2007. “On the theory of convolution equations of the third kind.”
Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 331 (2): 1314-1336.
[65] Welch, I. 2000. “Herding among security analysts.” Journal of Financial Economics
57: 369-396.
[66] Wu, J., and A. Zang. 2009. “What determines financial analysts’ career outcomes
during mergers?” Journal of Accounting and Economics 47: 59-86.
[67] Xue, H. 2015. “Independent and affiliated analysts: Disciplining and herding.”Work-
ing paper.
[68] Zhang, J. 1997. “Strategic delay and the onset of investment cascades.”RAND Journal
of Economics 28 (1): 188-205.
[69] Zitzewitz. E. 2001. “Measuring herding and exaggeration by equity analysts and other
opinion sellers.”Working paper.
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX OF PROOFS 58
Appendix A
Appendix of Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. By Claims 1-5, Fj (t) must be such that an informed analyst i’s









e−riafj (a) da+ (1− Fj (t))
(





Taking the FOC with respect to t, we have
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e−ritfj (t)− fj (t)
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e−rit− (1− Fj (t))
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− (1− Fj (t))
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and multiplying the above equation by ecjt, we have
fj (t) e
cjt + Fj (t) e
cjt · cj = cje
cjt
APPENDIX A. APPENDIX OF PROOFS 59










cjt = ecjt − α
Fj (t) = 1− αe
−cjt
We see that Fj (t) follows an exponential path, which implies that the constant hazard
rate is equal to cj . Thus,
d
dt
ln (1− Fj (t)) = −cj
ln (1− Fj (t))− ln (1− Fj (0)) = −cjt
Fj (t) = 1− (1− Fj (0)) e
−cjt
Thus, α = 1− Fj (0), and is analyst j’s potential atom at t = 0. By similar argument for
analyst i, we have











The endogenous terminal time to the game is given by T = min {T1, T2}. To determine
T , we have that
1− e−ciTi = 1− xi
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Hence, T = min
{





. Suppose that Ti > Tj. Then Fj (0) = 0 and
Fi (0) is determined by
1− (1− Fi (0)) e
−ciTj = 1− xi
(1− Fi (0)) e
−ciTj = xi























Proof of Corollary 1. Recall that T = min
{






































, which implies the first part of the claim. Assuming
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If ω2j − ω
2
i > 0, then
s > ω2j + ω
2
i










i < 0, then
s < ω2j + ω
2
i
However, this can never be the case since s > ω2j + σ
2
i . Thus, if Ti > Tj, then it must be
that ω2j > ω
2





, and analyst i has the atom at time 0. Hence, the analyst
with more precise information forecasts earlier.
Proof of Corollary 2. Recall that T = min
{



































Assuming ω2i = ω
2



























s− ω2 − σ2
ln (xi) <
σ2 − ω2
s− ω2 − σ2
ln (xj)
ln (xi) < ln (xj)
xi < xj
Which is equivalent to 1− xi > 1− xj.
Proof of Corollary 3. Recall that T = min
{
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which we see is decreasing in ri and rj . Differentiating Ti with respect to σ
2
j , we have that
− ln (xj)
(






































ln (xj) > 0 since
ω2j − σ
2
j < 0 and ln (xj) < 0. A similar calculation can be done for σ
2
i . Hence T is
increasing in σ2i and thus decreasing in
1
σ2i
. Assuming ω2i = ω
2







































Since analyst i has the atom at t = 0 and ri > rj , this implies that the less patient analyst
forecasts earlier. Similarly, if ω2i = ω
2



































































Proof of Lemma 4. Assuming xj is fixed, analyst i faces the following maximization


























































































xj (s− σ2) + σ2
> xj














To see that xi = 0 when xj >
1
2 , limit the choice of xi to be either xi = xj or xi > xj .
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σ2 < σ2 + xjs




















s (xj + κ) < σ
2
Since s2 < σ
2, then this holds as long as xj ≤
1
2 . This implies that analyst i’s payoff is
greater by setting xi = xj when xj >
1
2 then by setting xi > xj , given that xi is restricted
to the interval [xj , 1]. However, we know that analyst i can do strictly better by setting
xi = 0 when xi = xj which implies that xi = 0 when xj >
1
2 .
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Where xi = x and xj = y. It follows from equation (A.1) that ui is continuous on [0, q]
since Ψ (x) is continuous by definition. Define Fi := {xi|ui (xi) = maxui}. From Lemma
4 and since Ψ (x) is nondecreasing, Fi is dense in [0, q]. Hence, ui is constant for x ∈ [0, q]
and so Fi = [0, q]. This implies that ui is differentiable. The fundamental theorem of
calculus and differentiability of ui imply that Ψ (x) is differentiable on [0, q].










































































































































































Where xi = x and xj = y for ease of exposition. By Lemma 5, Ψ (y) is differentiable and
analyst i’s utility must be constant over all choices of xi. Taking the FOC of equation
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0 yψ (y) dy −
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µ− σ2 = 0 (A.3)















µx− x3σ2 = 0
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ψ (y) dy =
3x2s− σ2µ
σ2 (x3 − x2)
Which is a Volterra equation of the second kind. K (x, y) = 3x
2−y
x2−x3
and h (x) = 3x
2s−σ2µ
σ2(x3−x2)
for x, y ∈ [0, q] are discontinuous at x = 0. We have that
∫ x
0 |K (x, y)| dy converges for all
x except for x = 0 in [0, q] and is finite in any region [ǫ, ǫ+ q] except for x = 0 in [0, q].
Note that we can divide [0, q] into k smaller intervals with bounds (ai, ai+1) such that
∫ x
ai
|K (x, y)| dy ≤ 1 since we can find ai such that x










by setting ai close to x. Hence, by Evans (1910), there exists a unique solution to ψ (x).
1
Proof of Proposition 1. By Claims 1-5, Fj (t) must be such that an informed analyst





























Proceeding as in the proof of Lemma 1 yields the result.
1Evans (1910) shows this by dividing K (·) into two components, one constant and the other a function
of the arguments. For the solution, an approximating series can be constructed in which each term is
constructed by first solving a singular differential equation and then solving an integral for the inhomo-
geneity of the subsequent differential equation. Alternatively, equation (A.3) can be expressed as a Volterra






ψ (y) dy =
2xsµ
σ2 (x− 1)
in which we can apply von Wolfersdorf (2007).
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Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that T = min
{


































which we see is decreasing in p2i b
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We see from the above that the bias p2i b
2
i only lowers T , thus reducing the overall time




















































































































































i < 0, then s < σ
2, but this cannot happen.






j if Ti > Tj . Hence, the player who is less biased
forecasts earlier.
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Proof of Theorem 2. We see from Proposition 1 that the equilibrium payoff for an




















i , then Fj (0) > 0,
and Fj (0) = 0 otherwise. Assume that in the case of indifference, the analyst sets pi to be
the lowest value which achieves the same payoff. When bi > bj , then analyst i can induce
an atom by analyst j by setting pi =
1








j for any choice of pj . In this
case, Fj (0) > 0 and Fi (0) = 0, and so an informed analyst j has an equilibrium payoff of
s − σ2i for any choice of pj , and thus sets pj = 0. Fj (0) is maximized when pi =
1
2 and
hence is a best response to any choice of pj. A similar argument holds for bi < bj which
gives pi = 0, pj =
1
2 . When bi = bj , any choice of pi <
1
2 is met with a pj > pi, and vice
versa. Hence, at least one of pj or pi must be equal to
1
2 . If pi =
1
2 , then analyst j is




, since if pj =
1
2 , then neither analyst has an atom,
and if pj <
1
2 , then only analyst j has an atom. In either case, analyst i will never have
an atom, and analyst j receives the same expected utility, thus setting pj = 0.
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−s+ ω2i + ω
2
j + (1− xj)
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When analyst i has the atom ex ante, then she sets xi = x
∗
i , where x
∗
i is the solution to




j . Otherwise, she can do strictly better
by receiving information with certainty and forecasting immediately. When analyst j has
the atom ex ante, then she sets xi according to equation (6.1) to maximize the size of the
mass point for analyst j.
Proof of Proposition 4. By Claims 1-5, Fj (t) must be such that an informed analyst












Taking the FOC with respect to t, we have
(sF ) e
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which is decreasing in sL − sF .






































































































, and analyst i has the
atom at time 0. Hence, the analyst with more precise information forecasts earlier. Results
for Corollaries 2 and 3 follow similarly. Analyst i’s expected utility from the information
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+ (1− x) (s− φ) + (φ− ωi)
y
x
− (φ− ωi) y
]
ψ (y) dy
where q ∈ (0, 1) is a fixed parameter as a determined by the Normal analog for Lemma 4.
Equation (A.4) is qualitatively identical to equation (A.2) and hence the proof of Theorem
1 can be replicated.











The FOC with respect to t is
− (r + λ)
∫ T
T−t





− (r + λ)λs
[
e−r(u+t−T )−λ(u−T+t)
− (r + λ)
]T
T−t





























Which is an equilibrium delay strategy when B = t∗.
